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Wielding the Double-Edged Sword: Creating the 
Perception of a Chinese Enterprise to Obtain and 
Enforce Patent Protection in China 
David A. Fazzolare* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Obtaining and enforcing patent protection in China is a double-
edged sword. On the positive side, China has one of the fastest 
growing economies among one of the world's largest potential 
consumer markets. On the negative side, China has rampant piracy 
and counterfeiting issues, as well as unsatisfactory enforcement of 
patent rights. 
A practical strategy for international businesses seeking to 
successfully wield the double-edged sword of obtaining and 
enforcing patent protection in China involves diminishing the 
incentives for corruption, bribery, and local protectionism that favor 
Chinese pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers. International 
businesses can diminish these incentives by creating the perception of 
a Chinese enterprise-that is, a business founded and operated in 
China, presumably by Chinese nationals. 
First, Part II of this Comment reviews concerns that 
international businesses face in deciding whether to obtain and 
enforce patent protection in China. In Part III, this Comment 
provides reasons for obtaining patent protection in China. Part IV 
explains why creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise can 
diminish the incentives for corruption, bribery, and local 
protectionism that traditionally favor Chinese pirates, counterfeiters, 
and infringers. Part V then analyzes Chinese laws limiting foreign 
investment in Chinese industries and laws governing the structural 
organization and ownership of foreign investment capital. 
International businesses must operate within the limits of these laws 
to create the perception of a Chinese enterprise. Finally, Part VI 
provides specific strategies that international businesses can use to 
successfully create the perception of a Chinese enterprise. 
* J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University (2009). The author is 
a licensed patent agent. 
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II. FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN DECIDING WHETHER TO 
OBTAIN PATENT PROTECTION IN CHINA 
International businesses must consider several factors when 
deciding whether to obtain patent protection in China. They must 
be aware of negative trends-namely corruption, bribery, and 
protectionism-that currently undermine justice in the Chinese 
judicial system. These contribute to a lack of impartiality, a lack of 
transparency, unsatisfactory enforcement of patent rights, and 
remedies that favor imitators over inventors. 
A. The Judiciary)s Lack of Impartiality 
Corruption, bribery, and protectionism undermine impartial 
decision making in China. I First, judicial corruption stems from the 
Communist Party's control over appointment and promotion of 
senior judges.2 With that control, Chinese courts exercise judicial 
authority on behalf of the state,3 and thus on behalf of the Chinese 
Communist Party. In fact, some suggest that the judiciary is strictly 
controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.4 Given the direct 
influence over the appointment and promotion of senior judges, it is 
hard to imagine how judicial decisions in China can reflect anything 
but the official Communist Party platform and its underlying 
motivations and interests. Moreover, the use of informal 
relationships to bypass formal legal processes has produced pervasive 
corruption of the Chinese judiciary.s Personal connections are often 
used to directly impair impartiality through the bribing of judges.6 
Second, pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers resort to bribery as 
a means to thwart proper enforcement of patent protection.7 In 
particular, "Chinese provincial authorities, 'far away over the 
mountains,' benefIt financially or politically from the proceeds of 
piracy or, instead, turn a blind eye to powerful local interests that 
1. Thomas E. Volper, Note, TRIPS EnjiJrcement in China: A Case /iJr Judicial 
Transparency, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309, 313, 327 (2007). 
2. See Eu Jin Chua, The Laws of the People's Republic of China: All Introduction ji,r 
International Investors, 7 CHI. J.INT'L L. 133, 138 (2006). 
3. Id. at 134. 
4. Sec Volper, supra note 1, at 328-29. 
5. Id. at 327. 
6. Id. 
7. See, e,q., Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor is Far Away: China's En/iJrcmlent of 
Intellectual Property R(qhts Protection, 1986-2006,7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 231,232-33 (2006). 
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do."~ Under the influence of bribery, judges and administrators fail 
to act impartially at the outset of investigating allegations of 
infringement.'} As a result, otherwise meritorious claims of 
infringement may be summarily dismissed; efforts to investigate the 
infringement claims may be relaxed; or early remedies, such as 
preliminary injunctions to stop infringement, may not be awarded. 
Third, local protectionism pervades the judicial landscape in 
China.1O De facto local protectionism results from the ability of local 
people's congresses to remove judges. Il Fear of removal from 
comfortable positions of power unduly influences judges to ensure 
that local businesses and agencies-often engaging in piracy, 
counterfeiting, and infringement-succeed in lawsuits irrespective of 
the merits of a case. 12 Thus, impartiality is forgone in favor of 
protecting the interests of local businesses and agencies-usually to 
the detriment of international competitors. 
B. Lack of Judicial Transparency and Predictability in the Judiciary 
In addition to facing issues such as corruption and local 
protectionism, international businesses accustomed to common law 
systems face unpredictable judicial determinations when they seek to 
enforce patent rights in China. This unpredictability stems from 
China's lack of judicial transparency in three important areas: the 
precedential value of case law, the reporting of judicial decisions, and 
the construction of patent claims. 
First, judicial determinations in China lack predictability because 
the Chinese legal system does not accept or recognize cases as a 
source of law. 13 China has a civil law instead of common law 
system. 14 Unlike common law, the Chinese system is based around 
several codes that guide the law. Therefore, international businesses 
cannot look to judicial decisions for indications of the way a court 
may rule in a patent infringement proceeding.15 And even if China 
did recognize cases as legal precedent, opinions reduced to writing 
8. Id. 
9. See Voiper, supra note I, at 326. 
10. Id. at 327. 
II. See id. at 327-28. 
12. See id. at 328. 
13. Id. at 329-30; Ruay Lian Ho, Compliance and ChallenlJes Faced by the Chinese 
Patent System under TRIPS, 85 1. PAT. & TRADEMARK On. Soc:'y 504, 514 (2003). 
14. See lJenerallv Ho, supra note 13. 
15. Id. 
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are characteristically brief, without much analysis or legal reasoning 
to assist international businesses in determining their legal positions 
with much accuracy.16 
However, international businesses may flnd refuge in recent 
trends where the published decisions of cases involving foreign 
parties have provided more legal analysis and legal reasoning. 17 
Despite this helpful trend, written decisions still provide little 
practical value if the decisions cannot stand as binding precedent. 
Consequently, the reporting of decisions that are not recognized as a 
valid source of law in China makes judicial determinations 
unpredictable for international businesses. 
Second, reported judicial decisions provide little guidance for 
international businesses seeking to enforce patent rights in China. 
For starters, few opinions are published and fewer opinions become 
public without editing by China's high court. IX The Supreme 
People's Court (SPC) publishes some of its opinions in its oHlcial 
Gazette, but these opinions are also edited. IY Even decisions of the 
lower courts that may appear in the Gazette are often revised by the 
Spc.20 Of the cases that are decided, there exists "no comprehensive 
and searchable system for reporting judicial decisions in China.,,21 
Given the highly edited nature of reported cases and the inability to 
search for these cases in a comprehensive manner, there is little 
transparency in the reporting of judicial decisions in China. 
Third, judicial determinations of patent infringement in China 
are much more unpredictable because Chinese courts have not 
established uniform canons of patent claim construction to assist 
patentees and alleged infringers in predicting how courts will 
interpret patent c1aims.22 
C. Unsatisfactory Enforcement of Patent Rights 
Along with its poor record of judicial transparency, China has 
developed a reputation for unsatisfactory enforcement of patent 
rights, despite its desire to be known as a respecter of international 
patent rights. This is mainly due to China's insuffIcient eHorts to end 
16. Chua, supra note 2, at 136. 
17. Seeid. 
18. Volper, supra note 1, at 313. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 329. 
22. Id. at 337. 
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infringing and illegal activity.23 China's unsatisfactory enforcement 
stems from both its inability to persuade authorities to take a serious 
look at infringing activities and the largely ineffective sanctions 
leveled against infringers. For example, a spokesman of the State 
Intellectual Property OHice (SIPO) suggested that bribing local 
oflicials may frequently be a prerequisite to initiate investigation of 
infringement allegations.24 Even more troubling, in cases that 
necessitate investigation in China, the end result is often "toothless 
administrative enforcement" rather than effective police action.25 The 
natural consequence of such policies is that administrative seizures 
and fines have become accepted as a necessary business cost by 
infringers.26 
To China's credit, recent judicial decisions have heightened 
restrictions on patent infringement. The criminal threshold quantity 
for patent infringement was lowered from 1000 units to 500 units, 
but the United States maintains that such quantities still permit 
pirates and counterfeiters to operate under a safe harbor on a 
commercial production scale.27 With safe harbors for commercial 
scale production of pirated goods and Chinese infringers accepting 
administrative fines and seizures as a necessary business cost, China's 
record of enforcement of patent rights remains unsatisfactory. 
D. Remedies Benefit Imitators Rather than Innovators 
In China, available remedies are not only unsatisfactorily applied, 
but also benefit imitators rather than innovators because (1) 
stringent evidentiary standards coupled with inadequate discovery 
procedures make patent enforcement outcomes unfavorable for 
patent owners, and (2) patent owners with otherwise meritorious 
infringement claims often tlnd their damages awards eviscerated by 
determinations of patent invalidity in separate proceedings. 
China's stringent evidentiary standards, when coupled with 
inadequate discovery procedures, make it more diftlcult to obtain 
23. Id. at 326. China's record of unsatisflctory ent()rccment of patent rights led the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) to initiate a WTO action against China in April 
2007. Id. at 309-11. The USTR trequently receives complaints about the lack of unit()rm, fair, 
and consistent entc)rcement of intellectual property rights and regulations in China's courts. Id. 
at 331. 
24. Id. at 326. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 325-26. 
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preliminary inJunctions and adequate damages awards, thus 
complicating patent enforcement dforts. First, an international 
business seeking a preliminary injunction to halt infringement must 
clearly prove both infringement and irreparable harm.2x But clearly 
proving both infringement and irreparable harm may prove 
insurmountable without adequate discovery procedures to obtain the 
underlying evidence.2,} In fact, preliminary injunctions may be 
nothing more than a fictional remedy in China because the SPC has 
instructed lower Chinese courts that preliminary injunctions are 
unavailable in cases that involve "non -literal infringement or 
complicated technologies. ,,30 
Damages awards in China are subject to the same strict 
evidentiary standards, making it extremely difficult to obtain 
adequate awards through successful patent infringement litigation. 
Additionally, infringer's profits form the basis for assessing patent 
damages and plaintiffs must rely on preservation of evidence to 
gather the pertinent sales and accounting data from the defendant. 
Proving damages can be particularly difficult considering the lack of 
formal discovery mechanisms in China.31 Consequently, damages 
awards in China are extremely low in comparison to the United 
States. 32 
Even after international businesses prove damages, patent owners 
often find their damages awards eviscerated by determinations of 
patent invalidity in separate proceedings. In China, alleged patent 
infringers often seek stays of infringement cases by initiating 
invalidation actions with the Patent Reexamination Council ("PRC") 
to challenge the validity of the infringed patent.33 Patent invalidation 
proceedings may occur parallel with patent infringement litigation of 
the underlying patent at issue; if the invalidation proceedings occur 
after the infringement litigation, a stay of the infringement award 
28. J. Benjamin Bai et aI., What Multinational Companies Need to Know About Patent 
Invalidation and Patent Lit(qation in China, ,5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 449, 458-60 
(2007). 
29. Id.at449. 
30. [d. at 459. 
31. Id. at 449. 
32. Id. Chinese courts are permitted to include reasonable expenses and attorney fees in 
calculated damages. Id. This might compensate f()r the costs of assuming the risk of patent 
litigation, but recovery of attorney fees in China is rare. Id. 
33. Chua, supra note 2, at 154. In tact, international businesses are increasingly 
becoming subject to invalidation proceedings bet()re the PRe. Bai et aI., supra note 28, at 449. 
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may occur. 34 
Invalidation proceedings usually involve invention patents, while 
infringement litigation usually applies to utility model patents and 
design patents. 3S International businesses owning invention patents 
should expect parallel invalidity and infringement proceedings.36 
Indeed, it is not uncommon for a patent found to be infringed by 
the People's Courts to be subsequently invalidated by the Patent 
Reexamination Board (PRE).37 International businesses in these 
circumstances will find little assurance in the fact that the 
intermediate court reverses decisions of the PRE less than twenty 
percent of the time. 3x International businesses thus face multiple 
legal hurdles in the quest for patent protection. 
E. Effects of the Negative Judicial Trends 
International businesses looking to obtain Chinese patent 
protection should not only be concerned with the challenges of 
obtaining patent protection, but also widespread infringement, 
piracy, and counterfeiting after a patent is obtained. 39 This patent 
34. Sec3C1lerallvBai et aI., supra note 28. 
35. Id. '''Invention' in the Patent Law means any new technical solution relating to a 
product, a process or an improvement thercof" Chinacourt, Rules t()r the Implementation of 
the Patent Law of the PRC, art. 2 (Dec. 21, 1992), available at 
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id~3327. '''Utility model' in the Patent Law 
means any new technical solution relating to the shape, the structure, or their combination, of 
.1 product, which is tit t()r practical use." Id. '''Design' in the Patent law means any new design 
of the shape, pattcrn, colour, or their combination, of a product, which creates an aesthetic 
teeling and is tit t()r industrial application." Id. 
36. See.qenerally Bai et aI., supra note 28. 
37. See id. at 449. The Patent Reexamination Board examines invalidation requests 
under Article 45 of PRC Patent Law. See Patent Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 
46, aJ'ailable at http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/200203/ 
t20020327 _33872.htm (Aug. 25, 2000). Article 45 allows any individual or entity to 
challenge the validity of a newly issued Chinese patent t()r lack of cont(mnance to the PRC 
Patent Laws. Id. art. 45. 
38. Id. 
39. Intringement estimates of all t(>rIm of intellectual property in China exceed 90%. 
Volper, supra note I, at 309. Among the intringing products seized at United States customs, 
more than 80% originated in China. Id. Estimates of counterteit goods originating in China 
exceeds billions of dollars and is growing in double-digit percentages each vear. Kirk Hermann 
et aI., Protectin.q Nanotechnol!tqy Intellectual Property ("Nano-IP») In China, 2 NANOTECH. L. 
& Bus. 96, 108 (2005). International software companies should be concerned that an 
estimated 90% of software being used in China is pirated. Id. Additionally, a substantial 
number of well-known brands being sold in China are estimated to be counterteit-
approximately 15 to 20%. Samir B. Dahman, Protectin3 Your IP Rights in China: An Overview 
o{the Process, I ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 63, 63 (2006). According to the U.S. Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection, China is the largest counterteiter. Emma Schwartz, China 
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infringement harms businesses in at least two ways. 
First, patented goods pirated in China result in lost sales and 
diluted good will for the patent holder.40 If infringing goods are 
permitted to be sold in China, international businesses do not 
benefit from the patent monopoly granted by a Chinese patent and 
must determine whether it makes sense to incur the time and 
expense required to obtain a Chinese patent. 
Second, Chinese businesses making and exporting infringed 
goods directly reduce global sales and cause brand name dilution.41 
If Chinese infringers are permitted to make patented products within 
China and sell the patented products to countries in which the 
patentee has not applied for a patent, it seriously diminishes the 
incentive for international businesses to incur the time and expense 
required in obtaining patent protection in China. 
III. REASONS FOR OBTAINING CHINESE PATENT PROTECTION 
Despite China's record of unsatisfactory patent enforcement, 
there are compelling reasons for obtaining patent protection in 
China. These include the size of the Chinese market, global trends of 
business competitors, Chinese accession to most relevant 
international intellectual property treaties, and recent Chinese 
reforms. 
A. The Chinese Market 
The vast size of the Chinese market and the anticipated growth 
of the Chinese economy may warrant obtaining patent protection in 
China. China's potential consumer market is the largest in the world 
with approximately 1.3 billion people living in China.42 In addition, 
China's economy is among the fastest growing and is expected to 
one day be the world's largest.43 While the size of the Chinese 
Tries New Tactics in Patent Ftqht (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.law.com/ 
jsp /law/LawArticleFriendly .jsp? id~900005 546611. 
40. Dahman, supra note 39. 
41. Id. 
42. China Population Int()rmation and Research Center, Major F(qures of the 20()() 
Population Census, http://www.cpirc.org.cn/en/e5cendatal.htm (Mar. 28,2001). 
43. The Chinese economy could surpass Germany and Japan within ten vears and may 
eventually overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy within thirty-tive 
years. Robert C. Bird, Defendincq Intellectual Property Rights in the RRIC Economies, 43 AM. 
Bus. 1.J. 317, 318 (2006). Within three years of the prior publication, China has already 
surpassed Germany in terms of GD P making China the third largest economy in the world. 
Press Release, China Daily, China Overtakes Germany in Terms of GDP (Jan. 15, 2009), 
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market alone may not be enough to tip the scales in favor of 
obtaining patent protection in China, it is an encouraging factor. 
Assuming that the reforms mentioned below in Section Dare 
implemented, Chinese patent protection may provide international 
businesses with more satisfactory enforcement. Given the five-year 
period for implementation of the reforms, and the twenty-year term 
for patent protection, satisfactory patent enforcement seems much 
more plausible during the latter years of the patent term. If patent 
enforcement becomes satisfactory as a result of these reforms, the 
vast size of the Chinese market becomes a compelling factor. The 
patent will then provide a limited monopoly for the remainder of the 
patent term, thus paying huge dividends for the international 
businesses that are willing to assume the risk of obtaining patent 
protection with the hopes that enforcement becomes satisfactory. 
B. Global Business Competitors 
Trends in global competition suggest that many international 
businesses are attempting to establish a dominant patent position in 
China.44 China has seen a noticeable increase in the number of 
international businesses applying for patent protection within its 
borders4s since it signed the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Accord).46 At the same time, 
there has been a huge increase in the number of Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) applications being filed at the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) from Chinese competitors.47 
Consequently, international businesses are likely to find themselves 
aJ'ailable at http://www.chinadaily.com.en/china/2009-01/15/contenc7400438.htm. 
44. Ken Howard, Patent F(qhts Rumble in China, 3 NATURE REVIEWS DRUl; 
DISCOVERY 988 (2004). 
45. Yolper, supra note 1, at 324; Press Release, China Daily, Patent Applications 
Increase in First Half Year (Aug. 29, 2006), available at http://www.china.org.cn/ 
english/BAT/179386.htm. 
46. The TIUPS Accord was an attempt to provide and implement unif(mnity with 
respect to intellectual property rights. WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Agreements, 
Intellectual Property: Protection and Enf(lrCement, available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tiLe/agrm7 _e.htm. Under a common set of international 
regulations, signatories (fellow WTO members) must establish a minimum level of protection, 
thereby striking an agreed-upon balance between long-term benefits and short-term costs of 
protective provisions. [d. 
47. Yolper, supra note 1, at 324. The PCT was f(lrmed by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. It is an international agreement that allows f(lr the tiling of a single 
patent application to have effect in all of the signatory states. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 
19,1970,28 U.S.T. 7645,1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
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facing increased competition for Chinese patent rights not only from 
other international companies, but also from Chinese companies 
themselves. If global competitors are assuming the risks of obtaining 
Chinese patent protection, following suit may be necessary to remain 
competitive on a global scale. 
C. China is a Signatory to Most Major International IP Treaties 
China's status as a signatory to a majority of the important 
international intellectual property treaties4X argues in favor of 
obtaining patent protection in China. Treaties that China has signed 
include the Paris Convention,49 the Madrid Agreement,SO the 
Protocol relating to the Madrid Agreement,Sl the Berne 
48. Chua, supra note 2, at 150. 
49. See Paris Convention fCJr the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as 
last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967,21 U.ST. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. The Paris 
Convention fCJ[Jned a union among signing countries fCJr the protection of industrial property, 
including the protection of patents, utility models, industrial designs, tradenurks, service 
marks, trade names, indications of source or origin, and protection against unfair competition. 
Id. art. 1, § 1. Chin,l became a member of the Paris Union, as fCJ[Jlled by the Paris 
Convention, on December 19, 1984. World Intellectual Property Organization, Paris 
Notification No. 114, Accession by the People's Republic ofChilu, Dec. 19, 1984, aJ'ailable 
at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/paris/treaty_paris_114.html. 
50. See Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 
14,1891, as revised at Stockholm, July 14,1967,828 U.N.T.S. 389. The Madrid Agreement 
allows owners of trademarks or service marks to secure protection fCJr their nationally registered 
marks in any of the contracting states by filing the marks at the International Bureau of 
Intellectual Property. !d. art. I, § 2. China's accession to the Madrid Agreement became 
effective on October 4, 1989 subject to declaration concerning Article 14(2)( d) that limited 
applicability of the agreement to marks registered on or after this date. World Intellectual 
Property Organization, Madrid Notification No. 41, Accession by the People's Republic of 
China, July 4, 1989, available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/madrid-
gp/treaty_madrid_gp_41.html. On July 24, 2003, China withdrew its declaration under 
Article 14(2)(d) of the Madrid Agreement. World Intellectual Property Organization, Madrid 
Notification No. 145, Notification by the People's Republic of China: Withdrawal of 
Declaration Concerning Article 14( 2)( d), (July 24, 2003), al'ailable at 
http://\\'\\w.wipo.int/edocs/ncltdclcs/en/madrid-gp/treaty_madrid_gp_ 145.html. 
51. The Madrid Protocol improves the flexibility of the Madrid Agreement by creating a 
system of international registr,uion of marks which provides protection in each designated 
Contracting Party. World Intellectual Property Organization, Summary of the Madrid 
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks (1891) and the Protocol 
Relating to that Agreement (1989), alJailable at Imp:! /w\\w.wipo.int/treaties/en/ 
registration/madrid_protocol/sul11mary _madrid.htm!. China deposited its instrul11ent of 
accession to the Madrid Protocol on September I, 1995. World Intellectual Property 
Organization, Madrid Notification No. 69, Accession by the People's Republic of China, 
(Sept. 6, 1995), available at http://\\ww.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/madridp-gp/ 
tre'lty_madridp_gp_69.html. The Madrid Protocol entered into tCJrce with respect to China on 
April I, 1996, subject to a declaration under Article 14( 5) that no protections under the 
agreement would be extended betclre this date. World Intellectll<ll Property Organization, 
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Convention,52 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty53-arguably the 
most important international treaty concerning patent protection. 
China's willingness to participate in all major intellectual property 
treaties suggests that it is attempting to become a responsible player 
in the international patent arena. Because the country has, at least 
superficially,54 agreed to abide by these international norms, 
obtaining patent protection in China will be an increasingly 
important part of an international patent strategy. 
D. Chinese Reforms 
Probably the most significant reason for obtaining patent 
protection in China going forward is the growing potential for 
reform. Not only have Chinese oflicials publicly acknowledged the 
country's unsatisfactory enforcement record55 and the need to 
Madrid Notification No. 79, (Feb. 1, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
notdocs/en/madridp-gp/treaty_madridp_gp_79.html. China subsequently withdrew its 
declaration concerning Article 14( 5). World Intellectual Property Organization, Madrid 
:-.Jotification No. 80, (june 19, 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/ 
madridp-gp/treaty_madridp_gp_80.html. 
52. See lIenerally Herne Convention t()r the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris, july 24,1971, and amended on October 2, 1979,828 
U.N.T.S. 221. The purpose of the Herne Convention was to create a unit(mn means of 
protecting "the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works .... " See id. intro. China 
became a member of the Herne Union on October 15, 1992, the date in which the Berne 
Convention entered into t(lrCe regarding China. World Intellectual Property Organization, 
Herne Notitication No. 140, Accession by the People's Republic of China, (July 15, 1992), 
aJ'ailable at http://www .wip(l.int/ ed(lcs/n(ltdocs/ en/berne/treaty _berncl40 .html. 
53. Patent Cooperation Treaty, june 19, 1970,28 U.5.T. 7645. The PCT entered into 
t(lrCe with respect to China on january 1, 1994. World Intellectual Property Organization, 
PCT Notitication No. 81, Accession by the People's Republic of China, (Oct. 1, 1993), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/pct/treaty_pcC81.html. The PCT 
created a system of facilitating international patent tilings. Jay Erstling & Isabelle Houtillon, 
77Je Patent Cooperation Treaty: At the Center of the International Patent System, 32 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1583, 1583 (2006). China has set t(ltth provisions t(lr implementation of 
the PCT. See Provisions Concerning the Implementation of the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 
China (effective jan. I, 1994) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.eng.yn.gov.cn/ 
yunnan English/ 144397762564194304/20050616/353272 .html. 
54. "Superticially," because international agreements such as these typically have no real 
ent(lrCement mechanism. However, the drawing up of such an agreement and China's 
signature to it represent early steps to the creation of an international patent standard. 
55. In a recent intellectual property compendium, China's State Council recognized 
that "China's intellectual property system is imperfect," people in China have a "poor sense on 
intellectual property," and "intellectual property intringements are serious." Circular of the 
State Council on Printing and Issuing of the National Intellectual Property Strategy 
Compendium, § 1(3) (Circulated by the State Council on june 5,2008) (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub /FD LEN/Laws/law _en_int(l. jsp?d(lcid=94069 [hereinafter II' 
Strategy CompendiumJ. 
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improve intellectual property protection before becoming a truly 
developed nation, but China has taken concrete action towards 
initiating patent enforcement reforms. 56 Likewise, Chinese businesses 
are increasingly showing respect for patent laws, rather than 
opposing or ignoring them. 57 Perhaps most importantly, though, the 
SPC has recognized that interference from the executive branch 
exists, and that Chinese parties do in fact benefit from corruption, 
bribery, and protectionism.5x 
The Supreme People's Court (SPC), in an effort to counter these 
perceptions, has introduced regulations and judicial interpretations 
combating piracy, infringement, and counterfeiting.59 As part of this 
effort, the SPC instituted two five-year reform plans. The first Five-
Year People's Court Reform Plan was unveiled in 1999. It included 
the goals of implementing anti-corruption regulations and creating a 
limited form of discovery in an efrort to promote a more adversarial-
type, common law system of proceedings.60 The second Five-Year 
People's Courts Reform Plan was unveiled in 2005. It included the 
bold, new concepts of guaranteeing financial independence for 
Chinese courts, employing significant cases as guidelines for 
interpreting legal outcomes in order to establish a more meaningful 
system of precedent, and bringing uniformity to the understanding 
of Chinese laws by courts and practitioners throughout China.61 
More recently, in 2008, the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
revealed its own ambitious five-year plan to prevent and punish 
corruption.62 The CPC called for unprecedented reforms, such as 
intense supervision of government officials at all levels, with 
requirements that they be closely examined for abuse of their 
positions in acquiring money, bribes, or otherwise interfering with 
markets or trade. 63 Additionally, the plan calls for media oversight by 
encouraging constructive criticism of the government and the 
56. Tian Lipu, the Commissioner of the State Intellectual Property Oltice, expressed 
China's need to switch from "made in China" to "invented in China." Volper, supra note 1, at 
323. 
57. Kirk Hermann et a!., Protecti1!H Nanotechno/I{IfY Intellectua/l'roper~v ("Nano-IP") in 
China,2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 96, lOS (2005). 
5S. Chua, supra note 2. 
59. Id. at 150. 
60. Id. at 137. 
61. Id. at 13S. 
62. Chinacourt, CPC Publicizes Party's Five-year Ami-Corruption Plan (Junc 23, 
200S), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/pubIic/ detail.php?id=4354. 
63. Id. 
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Cpc.64 
Although the actual impact these reforms will have on improving 
enforcement of Chinese patents is as yet unknown, they are, at least, 
a step in the right direction. If SPC reforms can create a judicial 
system that more closely comports with international expectations 
regarding transparency, impartiality, and satisfactory enforcement, 
then much of the concern surrounding China's judicial system will 
be alleviated. Given the twenty-year term for Chinese patent 
protection, these reforms could improve the patent landscape 111 
China long before the expiration of patents currently being issued. 
IV. CREATING THE PERCEPTION OF A CHINESE ENTERPRISE 
DIMINISHES THE INCENTIVES FOR NEGATIVE TRENDS 
Creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise diminishes the 
negative impacts of corruption, bribery, and local protectionism on 
international businesses operating in China. This perception blurs 
perceived distinctions between such businesses and local Chinese 
enterprises. A given company's success in creating such a perception 
is directly proportional to its presence within China-the greater the 
number of local Chinese citizens employed as managers, researchers, 
and laborers, the more successful the international business will be in 
creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise. Likewise, the greater 
the percentage of ownership retained by local Chinese citizens, the 
more it will blur the perceived distinctions between the international 
business operating in China and local Chinese enterprises that are 
engaged in piracy, counterfeiting, or infringement. 
When an international business fails to successfully create the 
perception of a Chinese enterprise, judicial officials have strong 
incentives to rule against the international business, regardless of the 
merits of the case. Upholding the patent monopoly of an 
international business will have a direct, negative impact not only on 
local entrepreneurs who are parties to the action, but on the entire 
local economy. For example, a permanent injunction against the sale 
of infringed goods has the potential to shut down a factory that 
64. See id. Consistent with these calls t(lr rdilfI11 the cre's highest "anti-graft" ofticial 
has also called ti,r improving ami-corruption laws. He Guoqiang, crc Central Commission 
ti,r Discipline Inspection Secretary, has stated that "anti-graft laws should be strictly 
implemented and violators... severely punished... to cultivate a legal environment in 
fighting corruption." Chinacourt, Top Chinese Anti-graft Ofticial Urges Retter Laws Against 
Corruption (No\'. 10, 20(8), available at http://cn.chinacourt.org/public/ 
detail.php?id=431l5. 
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reproduced the goods. The consequences of such action could be 
devastating to a local economy in a rural Chinese setting. Factory 
workers would lose their jobs, tax revenues would decrease, and the 
people could even become unruly. Avoidance of such consequences 
provides a strong incentive for the perpetuation of corruption, 
bribery, and local protection, often resulting in awards that are 
favorable to pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers. 
On the other hand, international businesses that successfully 
create the perception of a Chinese enterprise invite administrative 
and judicial officials to focus more on the merits of patent 
enforcement actions and less on the identity of the parties involved. 
Such businesses diminish the incentives for corruption by altering the 
cost-benefit analysis and the consequences of the enforcement 
decision. When an international business successfully creates the 
perception of a Chinese enterprise, the benefits of invalidating its 
patents and ruling in favor of pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers 
are less apparent. The decision becomes more outcome-neutral 
because a ruling against the international business then also has 
direct, negative consequences for the local economy. That is, if the 
patent of an international business with the perception of a Chinese 
enterprise is invalidated and infringement is not found, the 
international business, whose sole reason for doing business in China 
is to exploit its patent monopoly, may be forced to close its Chinese 
operations. This, in turn, could lead to the loss of local jobs and 
decreased tax revenues much in the same way that a judgment 
against an entirely local enterprise would. The more Chinese citizens 
employed by an international business, the greater the negative 
impact of unsatisfactory patent enforcement. 
Thus, creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise weakens 
the notion that international businesses asserting their patents will 
destabilize local Chinese economies. International businesses that 
successfully create the perception of a Chinese enterprise become 
indistinguishable from other local Chinese enterprises that otherwise 
resort to piracy, counterfeiting, or infringement. 
V. CHINESE LAWS RESTRICT THE CREATION OF A PERCEPTION OF A 
CHINESE ENTERPRISE 
Chinese law limits opportunities for intcrnationa' businesses to 
create the perception of a Chinese enterprise in two important ways: 
(1) it proscribes foreign investment in certain industries, and (2) it 
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A. Chinese Law Proscribes Foreign Investment in Chinese Enterprises 
International businesses looking to create the perception of a 
Chinese enterprise must first determine whether the industry of their 
inventions is one in which the Chinese government encourages, 
restricts, or prohibits foreign investment.65 The Chinese government 
prohibits foreign investment 111 industries with substantial 
implications on economic security, resource utilization, 
environmental protection, the public interest, and national security.66 
Foreign investment in these prohibited industries is foreclosed. 67 
Foreign investment in China is therefore limited to those 
industries designated as encouraged6~ or restricted.6Y Ideally, 
international businesses seeking to create the perception of a Chinese 
65. The Chinese government publishes a catalog listing industries in which f()reign 
investment is encouraged, restricted, or prohibited. Catalogue jilr the Guidance of Forei.Hn 
Im'estment Industries, Issued by the State Development and Refimn Commission and the 
Ministry of Commerce, MOFCOM Order [2007] No. 57 on 31 Oct., 2007 (Effective as of 
Dec. 1,2007) [hereinafter ForeilIn Investment CatallllJue]. The Foreii,n Im'estment CatallllJue is 
segmented into three catalogs including the Catalogue of Encouraged Foreign Investment 
Industries [hereinafter Encouraged Catalogue], the Catalogue of Restricted Foreign 
Investment Industries [hereinafter Restricted Catalogue], and the Catalogue of Prohibited 
Foreign Investment Industries [hereinafter Prohibited Catalogue]. 
66. Prohibited Catalogue, supra note 65. Article I of the Prohibited Catalogue 
proscribes Fanning, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery Industries; Article II proscribes 
certain Mining and Quarrying Industries; Article III proscribes particular aspects of the 
Manut:lCturing Industry; Article IV proscribes resource utilization of Production and Supply of 
Power, Gas and Water; Article V proscribes public interest industries involving Communication 
and Transportation, Storage, as well as Post and Telecommunication Services; Article VI 
proscribes Leasing and Commercial Service Industry; Article VII proscribes industries pertinent 
to opening research bcilities in China, including Scientific Research and Technical Services 
Industries, and Geological Prospecting; Article VIII proscribes industries where environmental 
impact may be a concern including Irrigation, Environment, and Public Utilities Management; 
Article IX proscribes the public interest in Education; Article X proscribes industries which may 
have a national security impact such as Art, Sports, and Entertainment Industries; and Articles 
XI and XII proscribe catch-all of Other Industries involving projects impacting military 
facilities or industries governed by treaties. Id. 
67. Id. Press Release, China Business Review, China's 2007 Foreign Investment Guide 
(Jan. & Feb. 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter China Business Review]. 
68. Encouraged Catalogue, supra note 65. Encouraged f()reign investment industries 
are those industries in which research, development, and manufacturing of goods and services 
may lead to improved national infrastructure, high-technology transfer, knowledge transfer, or 
improved resource utilization, to name a tew. See id. Encouraged investment industries 
generally overlap those in which investment is restricted or prohibited. For example, Article I 
of the Encouraged Catalogue carries the same title of Article I of the Restricted Catalogue, as 
well as Article I of the Prohibited Catalogue covering Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry 
and Fishery Industries. See cqenerally Foreiqn InFestment Catalltque, supra note 65. The primary 
difference lies in the scope ofthe permissions or prohibitions within each category. Id. 
69. See F(}re~qn Investment CatallllJue, supra note 65. 
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enterprise should fall within an encouraged industry because of the 
potential for incentives to the business/o such as favorable tax 
treatment or relative ease in obtaining operational permits and 
licenses.7! Thus, international businesses falling within an 
encouraged industry stand the greatest chance for success. 
International business falling within a restricted industry may 
have more difficulty creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise 
as restrictions may be prohibitive.72 For example, difficulty in 
obtaining requisite governmental operating permits and licenses may 
be increased.73 The complete range of incentives and restrictions vary 
by industry, necessitating the retention of local Chinese counsel for 
businesses contemplating entry into a restricted industry. Such 
prohibitions discourage businesses falling within the restricted 
industries from creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise. 
B. Chinese Law Proscribes Foreign Ownership of Chinese Enterprises 
Another barrier to international business creating the perception 
of a Chinese enterprise is the restriction of foreign ownership of 
Chinese enterprises. Foreign ownership interests in domestic Chinese 
enterprises are limited to four primary vehicles: (1) Sino-Foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures, (2) Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures, 
(3) Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, or (4) mergers and 
acquisitions of domestic Chinese enterprises?4 
1. Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures 
One way to acquire ownership interests in Chinese enterprises is 
through Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (EJV).7s EJVs are 
70. See China Business Revievi, supra note 67. 
71. Cf id. China has been scaling back favorable policies towards ti)reign investment, 
especially preferential tax policies. [d. 
72. Restricted t()reign investment industries may require the Chinese party to hold J 
majority of the shares. See JJenerally Restricted Catalogue, supra note 70. Restricted t()reign 
investment industries may alternatively limit ownership interests to equity joint ventures or 
contractual joint ventures. See id. art. 1,12; China Business Review, supra note 67. 
73. Fred M. Greguras, hlJ'estment and Operatincq in Restricted Industries in China, Oct. 
27, 2004, http://www.fenwick.com/d()(st()re/PublicJti(llls/O)rp()rate/ 
In\'escOperatin~In_China.pdt: "Restricted category projects are also subject to higher-level 
g()\'ernment approvals." China Business Review, supra note 67. 
74. Foreign ownership interests in domestic Chinese enterprises are subject to the 
categorical investment restrictions set t()rth in the Foreign Investment Catalog. Sce supra text 
accompanying notes 65-68. 
75. See JJcncrally Regulations t()r the Implementation of the Law on Sino-ti)reign Equity 
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established as Chinese limited liability companies.76 They are 
incorporated and managed jointly by the international business and a 
Chinese party.77 "Numerous rules and regulations enacted on 
different legislative levels complete the rather comprehensive legal 
framework governing EJVs."n One particular provision related to 
ownership and control is that parties to an EJV may jointly 
contribute capital "in cash or in kind."79 For EJVs, "[t]he parties to 
the venture shall share the profits, risks and losses in proportion to 
their respective contributions to the registered capital. "so 
International businesses choosing the EJV organizational 
structure should assess both profit and loss expectations, as well as 
retention of operational control and managerial decision making, in 
proportion to the respective capital contributions. Thus, 
international businesses choosing EJVs as an investment strategy may 
find limited ability to control the strategy and direction of the 
Chinese enterprise. However, one possible advantage of an EJV is 
that it may be perceived as a Chinese enterprise in direct proportion 
to the extent to which Chinese ownership is retained. 
2. Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 
Another means of acquiring ownership interests in Chinese 
enterprises are Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures (CJVS).Hl 
Joint Ventures (promulgated by the State Council, July 22, 2001) (P.R.C.), available at 
http://www.tai.gov.cn/pub/DI_EN/Laws/law_en_int().jsp?docid=51062; Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Chinese-t()reign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the 
National People's Congress, Mar. 15,2001) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.tai.gov.cn/ 
pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_int(l.jsp?docid=51033 [hereinafter EJV Laws]. EJVs are t()lInded 
upon principles of equality and mutual benefit. Id. art. I. EJVs are subject to government 
approval. Id. 
76. EJV Laws, supra note 75, art. 4; Lutz-Christian Wolff: China's Prirate 
Intt"rnational im'estment Law: One-way Street Into PRC Law?, 56 AM. J. COMPo L. 1039, 
1041 (200S). 
77. EJV Laws, supra note 75, art. 1; Wolff: supra note 76, at 1041-42. 
7S. Wolff: supra note 76, at 1041. 
79. EJV Laws, supra note 75, art. 5. Investment may also be made in the t(mn of 
industrial property rights. Id. Howe\'er, equipment and technoloh'Y f(mning the basis of an 
international businesses' contribution has to be "advanced technology and equipment" that 
ti.t1tils a Chinese national need. Id. 
SO. Id. art. 4; Sinova Management Consultancy, Ltd" Four Main Types oj' Foreign 
/1IJ'cstment m China, I, available at http://www.sinO\·a.wm/ _tiles/ 
Fourmaintypesotl()reigninvestmentinChina.pdf [hereinafter Four Investment Types]. "The 
proportion of the investment contributed by the f()reign joint venture(s) shall generally not be 
less than 25% of the registered capital of a joint venture." Id. 
SI. See Hcncrallv Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual 
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CNs, like EJVs, are Chinese enterprises established by joint 
investment between international businesses and Chinese 
entrepreneurs, which the Chinese Government must approve. X2 
Unlike EJVs, which require strictly proportioned shares, CJVs offer 
greater flexibility in freedom to contract and organizational 
structure.X3 An additional aspect of CJV flexibility is the way 
respective values of capital contributions are determined. Parties to a 
CN can decide the method of evaluating contributions, as well as 
the actual value of the contributions themseives.X4 
"A [CJV] project usually involves the foreign partner to provide 
most or all of the funds and technology, key machineries whilst the 
Chinese partner will contribute land, facilities, natural resources and 
perhaps a limited amount of funding. "X5 Given the changing 
economic climate in China, CJVs are less common.X6 One reason for 
their decreased popularity is the increased bargaining position of 
Chinese entrepreneurs in terms of capital and technical know-how-
a result of Chinese economic expansion and an influx of foreign 
investment over the last several decades. 
Despite the decreased popularity of CJVs, flexibility in value 
assessments of contributions to a CJV can be particularly attractive to 
international businesses with dominant patent portfolios. These 
businesses find CJVs attractive because the value of contributions in 
determining ownership and managerial retention can be based on 
knowledge and technology. Thus, international businesses with 
dominant patent portfolios in a given industry can theoretically 
negotiate a premium for their contributions, resulting in a 
disproportionately high share of ownership and managerial control. 
However, government supervision of these contracts could result 
in the rejection of CJVs that attempt to provide a disproportionate 
benefit to international businesses. x7 Nonetheless, savvy international 
joint Ventures (Order of the President, No. 40, Oct. 31, 2000), al'ailablc at 
http://www.fui.gov.cn/pub/FDCEN/Laws/law_en_inhjsp?docid=SI 032 [hereinafter CjV 
Laws]. 
82. See id. arts. 1-6; see also Four InJ'estment 7.'vpes, supra note 80. 
83. In particular, profit and loss sharing is determined as set t()rth by contract rather 
than dictated by equity interests. See CjV Laws, supra note 81, art. 2; see also Four Irtl'cstment 
Types, supra note 80. 
84. In addition, operational and management control are determined by the ejY, 
subject to government approval. CjY Laws, supra note 81, art. II. 
8S. Four Irtl'estment Types, supra note 80. 
86. Id. 
87. Article I of the CjY Laws states that CjYs are established upon principles of 
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businesses with dominant patent portfolios may be able to invest via 
CJVs while also negotiating favorable contracts that place a premium 
on their patent protection. In this regard, international businesses 
can theoretically contribute less capital in the form of cash so that 
the endeavor can be perceived predominantly as a Chinese 
enterprise, while the international business retains a majority stake in 
operational control and profitability. 
3. Wholly-Owned Foreign Enterprises 
Ownership in a Chinese enterprise may also be established 
through creation of Wholly-Owned Foreign Enterprises (WOFEs).gg 
In contrast to the joint structure of EJVs and CJVs, WFOEs are, as 
their name implies, fully invested and operated by international 
businesses as a Chinese limited liability company.~Y Thus, liability is 
limited to initial capital and asset contributions.YO WOFEs provide 
international businesses with full control over "major decisions, 
products, costs, and employee culture. They also allow strategic 
alignment with the parent company and greater protection of 
intellectual property. "YI 
Despite these advantages, WOFEs may be difficult investment 
vehicles for creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise, because 
the legal status is one of a wholly-owned foreign enterprise. As such, 
local courts and officials, knowing the entity to be owned by foreign 
interests, may not perceive the international business as a Chinese 
equality and mutual benetit. Articles 5 and 6 of the CJV Laws discuss government approval. 
Thus, the approval authorities are able to reject contractual joint ventures that do not comport 
with equality and mutual benefit---disapproval is probably likely where the greater disadvantage 
lies with the Chinese partner. CJV Laws, supra note 86, Jrt. 1. 
88. See ,qenerallv Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-capital Enterprises, 
(order of the President, No. 41, Oct. 31, 2000), available at http://\\ww.tai.gov.cn/ 
pu b /F D I_EN/Laws/la\\'_en_info.jsp?docid=51 034 [hereinafter WOFE Laws]. WOFEs are set 
up in China by international businesses with only their own capital. See id. art. 2. But branches 
of international businesses set up in China are not included. See id. WOFEs are permitted to 
advance development of China's national economy, Id. art. 3, In particular, "[t]he State may 
encourage the establishment of t()reign capital enterprises that are export-oriented or 
technologically advanced WOFEs." Id. In this regard, WOFEs are subject to examination and 
approval by the Chinese government. See id. art. 6. 
89. Four Im'c.rtment Types, supra note 80, at 2, 
90. Id. 
91. Id. WOrEs operation,ll and managerial control are only limited by their "approved" 
articles of association. WOFE Laws, supra note 88, art. 11. Thus, once the appropriate 
governmental authority approves a WOFE's articles of association, the management and 
operation of the WOrE is "free trom any interference" provided that it otherwise operates 
within the con tines of Chinese law. Sec id. art. 11. 
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enterprise in the same way as an EJV or CJV. 
While maintaining control over Chinese operations IS an 
important aspect to successfully obtaining and enforcing patent 
protection in China, the decreased ability of WOfEs to create the 
perception of a Chinese enterprise may outweigh the advantage of 
maintaining complete control. Yet, where complete control is 
essential to a business objective, WOFEs should not be overlooked. 
4. Mergers and acquisitions of domestic Chinese enterprises 
International businesses can also acquire ownership interests in 
domestic Chinese enterprises through mergers and acquisitions.lJ2 
Mergers and acquisitions of domestic Chinese enterprises may occur 
through Equity Mergers and Acquisitions (EMAs) or through Asset 
Mergers and Acquisitions (AMAs).<J3 
EMAs come in two forms. International businesses can either 
buy equity stakes from shareholders of Chinese enterprises,94 or they 
can "subscribe to the increase in the registered capital" of the 
Chinese enterprise such that the Chinese enterprise becomes a 
foreign-investment enterprise (FIE).95 EMAs confer the advantage of 
ownership of the Chinese enterprise in proportion to its equity 
purchase, but EMAs pose greater risks than AMAs because of the 
increased risk of debt acquisition.96 In this regard, international 
businesses may learn that in addition to acquiring an ownership 
92. See lfenerally Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors, (Ministry of Commerce, Order No. 10, Sept. 8, 2006), 
available at http://www.tai.gov .en/pub /FDI_EN/Laws/law _en_intc).jsp?docid=66925 
[hereinafter MA Laws j. The MA Laws were adopted, inter alia, with a goal of "introducing 
advanced technologies and management experience trom abroad" and "improving the 
utilization oft()reign investment." Id. art. 1. In addition, mergers and acquisitions are "subject 
to the approval ofthe examination and approval authorities[ .j" Id. art. 6. As such, mergers and 
acquisitions that do introduce technical knowledge or expertise into China may not be 
approved by the Chinese government. Mergers and acquisitions of Chinese enterprises are also 
subject to the limitations set tc>rth in the Guidance Catalog of Fort"i.Hn Inl'estment Catal'lque. 
See, ceq., id. art. 4. 
93. See MA Laws, supra note 92, art. 2. In other words, international businesses can 
acquire ownership interests in Chinese enterprises through "stock purchase" Jnd "asset 
acquisition." Zhang Zhong Dong & Chen Zheng jun, Le..qal AnaZvsis o(Asset Acquisition by 
Foreifrn Inl'estors, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE (June 2008), at I, al'ailable at 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/ 1938497 /ChJnnclj75 76/Legal-Analysis-,)f 
Asset-Acquisition -by-F,)reign- Investors.html. 
94. See MA Laws, supra note 92, art. 2. HoweVer, the Chinese enterprise cannot be 
engaged in t()reign investment. See id. 
95. Seeid. 
96. See Zhang & Chen, supra note 93. 
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interest in the Chinese enterprise may also result in acquiring the 
burden of paying back debts owed by the Chinese enterprise.97 
AMAs reduce the risk of these debt traps because the only 
possible liabilities associated with the acquisition of assets arise if the 
Chinese enterprise had previously mortgaged the newly acquired 
asset.,)H This mortgage trap transfers liability to the international 
business regardless of whether the Chinese enterprise misrepresented 
facts about the mortgage.')') To minimize these risks, an international 
business should check the status of the target acquisition assets 
before acquiring them. 100 
AMAs can also take two forms. International businesses can form 
an FIE and use it to facilitate acquisition of a Chinese enterprise's 
assets by agreement to operate the assets. 101 Alternatively, the 
international business can buy the assets of the Chinese enterprise 
through agreement and let the asset investment form the basis to set 
up an FIE to operate the assets. 102 In addition to the avoidance of 
debt traps, AMAs allow selective acquisition of desirable assets of the 
Chinese enterprise. 103 
Mergers and acquisitions of existing Chinese enterprises may be 
the best way to create the perception of a Chinese enterprise because 
the Chinese enterprise will already have a proven record as a local 
enterprise and could already be benefiting from local protectionism, 
bribery, and corruption. The proportionate change in ownership may 
not be enough to affect any existing relationships between the newly 
acquired Chinese enterprise and the local community. Nor will the 
perception of the Chinese enterprise likely change as a result of the 
merger and acquisition. 
International businesses might consider buying into existing 
Chinese enterprises where the enterprise has an excellent reputation 
in the community as well as the manufacturing capacity and existing 
workforce necessary to produce the patented product on a 
commercial scale. In addition, international businesses might 
consider buying into existing Chinese enterprises that are already 
97. Id. 
98. See id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. Status int()rmation of "immovable property and land can easily be obtained trom 
the relevant government authorities." Id. 
101. See MA Laws, supra note 92, art. 2; see also Zhang & Chen, supra note 93. 
102. See MA Laws, supra note 92, art. 2.; see also Zhang & Chen, supra note 93. 
103. Zhang & Chen, supra note 93. 
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engaged in pirating, counterfeiting, or infringing their patented 
technology, effectively eliminating the illegal competition while 
creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise. 
VI. CREATING THE PERCEPTION OF A CHINESE ENTERPRISE TO 
OBTAIN AND ENFORCE CHINESE PATENT PROTECTION 
Creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise is essential to 
successfully wield the double-edged sword of obtaining and 
enforcing patent protection in China. Methods of creating the 
perception of a Chinese enterprise include: (1) opening research 
facilities in China to develop and patent inventions in China, (2) 
acquiring a total or partial stake in a Chinese enterprise and licensing 
the patented technology to the acquired Chinese enterprise, and (3) 
granting exclusive licenses to the Chinese enterprise to market the 
patented technology within China.104 
A. Opening Research Facilities in China to Develop and Patent 
Inventions 
International businesses seeking to create the perception of a 
Chinese enterprise can benefit from several distinct advantages by 
opening research facilities in China to develop and patent inventions 
within China. This strategy will command more respect from 
Chinese officials because the international business employing this 
strategy will be directly advancing China's national interest in 
transforming its reputation from "made in China" to "invented in 
China." 105 Therefore, international businesses conducting research in 
Chinese facilities probably would file a Chinese national patent 
application first. 106 Later, they can file a PCT application claiming the 
benefit of the Chinese patent's filing date.!07 Using this pattern of 
104. Volper, supra note I, at 315. 
105. See supra text accompanying note 56. China's national interest is to "build an 
innovative country." SeegeneralZv II' Stratet,')' Compendium, supra note 55. 
106. Under China's Patent Law inventions made in China must be tiled domestically in 
China first. However, a recent amendment to China's Patent Law adopted by the National 
People's Congress, which becomes effective Oct. I, 2009, permits inventors to apply t,)r 
patents in ti)reign countries bet-,)re filing domestically in China. Bur ti)reign patent tilings are 
subject to government review ti)r a determination as to whether the subject matter of invention 
should be kept as a national secret. The amendment is intended to encourage innovation and 
improve China's "international competitiveness." See lfeneralZv China Court, China Revises 
Patent Law to Encourage Innovation (jan. 13, 2009), aJ'ailable at 
http:// en.chinac()urt.()rg/public/ detail.php?id~4390. 
107. For an overview of PCT application filing procedure, see generally Erstling & 
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filing patent applications will directly advance China's national 
interest because China can then claim that technology invented by 
the foreign owners of the research facilities was invented in China. 
International businesses employing this strategy will likely benefit 
from the local good will that ordinarily attaches to local Chinese 
enterprises. 
Inventing and patenting technology in China that culminates in 
a Chinese national patent increases the likelihood that Chinese 
courts will uphold the patent during a patent infringement action or 
validity challenge. Because owning and asserting a Chinese patent 
creates the perception of a Chinese enterprise, this strategy reduces 
the home-field advantage that Chinese pirates, counterfeiters, and 
infringers might otherwise maintain. From the perception of a local 
Chinese court evaluating the patent, the playing field becomes that 
of a Chinese innovator versus a Chinese competitor, rather than a 
foreign innovator versus a Chinese competitor. Cases will thus be 
decided more on the merits and less on local biases. 
Retaining complete ownership and control of the enterprise is 
also a prudent practice for international businesses developing 
inventions in China. Without complete ownership, local Chinese 
investment partners may be able to assert ownership of any 
proprietary technology and subsequent patents directed thereto, 
regardless of whether the investors' contributions warrant ownership 
or not. Greater ownership levels can be accomplished through 
investment in WOFEs and complete acquisitions of existing Chinese 
en terprises. 
B. Acquiring a Total or Partial Stake in a Chinese Enterprise and 
Licensing the Patented Technology to the Acquired Chinese Enterprise 
International businesses seeking to create the perception of a 
Chinese enterprise can also acquire a total or partial stake in a 
Chinese enterprise and then license their own patented technologies 
to the Chinese enterprise. lOX This acquisition and licensing strategy 
confers two advantages. First, the international business retains 
ownership and control over the patented technology lO9 while 
substantially increasing the perception of a Chinese enterprise. 
Second, this may also be more profitable, as income is generated 
Routillon, supra note 53. 
108. Voiper, supra note 1, at 315. 
109. Id. 
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from licensing royalties and sales of the patented technology in 
proportion to the ownership stake from the acquisition of the 
Chinese enterprise. 
For example, if an international business making a partial 
acquisition chooses to invest via an EJV, its ownership would be 
limited in strict proportion to its capital contributions. If it invested 
via a CJV, however, the international business may be able to 
negotiate a greater ownership stake than it otherwise could have 
based strictly on its capital contributions. This is especially true 
where the international business has a dominant patent portfolio 
with a highly sought after technology. Pursuing this aspect of the 
acquisition and licensing strategy increases profits while minimizing 
legal ownership and capital contributions. In either case, acquiring 
partial ownership of the Chinese enterprise will enable the 
international business to present itself predominantly as a Chinese 
enterprise while retaining full ownership and control over the 
patented technology via the licensing agreement. 
Another advantage of partial acquisition is that the Chinese 
enterprise can maintain its local Chinese reputation, relationships, 
and any benefits it derives therefrom. Likewise, to the extent the 
Chinese enterprise benefits from local protectionism, these 
protections transfer to the international business. 
Acquiring a total ownership stake of the Chinese enterprise, on 
the other hand, will effectively transform the Chinese enterprise into 
a WOFE. Total acquisition strategy' also has its advantages. The 
international business will retain complete ownership of the patented 
technology and receive all of the profits. Additionally, a licensing 
agreement is no longer necessary when an international business 
acquires complete ownership of the Chinese enterprise. 
One potential drawback of total acquisition, however, is that the 
perception of a Chinese enterprise may be diminished. Chinese 
courts and administrative officials will undoubtedly have access to 
ownership records. As such, international businesses that totally 
acquire Chinese enterprises may be indistinguishable from other 
international businesses seeking to enforce their patents in China. 
Thus, a total acquisition strategy may do little to counter local 
corruption, bribery, and protectionism. 
An international business could avoid this drawback by acquiring 
a complete ownership stake in a Chinese enterprise that is already 
pirating, counterfeiting, or infringing the international business's 
patented technology. Pursuing a total acquisition strategy in this 
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manner offsets any disadvantages arising from the diminished 
perception of being an authentic Chinese enterprise, while gaining 
the advantage of removing unlawful competition from the market. 
Additionally, acquiring Chinese pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers 
allows the international business to retain any benefits previously 
derived from local protectionism. Thus, where piracy, counterfeiting, 
or infringement of an international business's patented technology is 
substantial, total acquisition of the Chinese enterprise engaged 
therein may be a viable strategy. 
C. Granting Exclusive Licenses to Chinese Enterprises to Make) Use) 
and Sell Patented Technology 
International businesses seeking to mimmlze risk while 
attempting to create the perception of a Chinese enterprise should 
consider granting exclusive licenses to existing Chinese enterprises to 
make, use, and sell their patented technologies within China. This 
strategy provides at least three benefits. 
first, it minimizes risk and liability while providing licensing 
royalties from sales of the patented invention. International 
businesses seeking to exploit the Chinese market in this fashion need 
not invest any capital in an existing Chinese enterprise or open up a 
research facility. As such, the international business does not assume 
any risk of loss from day-to-day operations or insufficient demand of 
the patented technology. 
Second, international businesses may grant exclusive licenses to 
make, use, and sell their patented technology to Chinese enterprises. 
This helps derive the full benefits of creating the perception of a 
Chinese enterprise without investing capital or assuming the liability 
risks of opening research facilities and acquiring existing companies. 
Under this strategy, the international business also grants the 
Chinese enterprise rights to assert the patented technology against 
competition in China. In this regard, the Chinese enterprise assumes 
the responsibility of enforcing the patent rights against unlawful 
competition and asserting its monopoly to exploit the Chinese 
market. By granting an exclusive license, the international business 
can retain royalties from sales while avoiding the costs associated 
with enforcement of the patent rights in China. The Chinese 
enterprise exclusive licensee will probably be on a level playing field 
when asserting rights against unlawful Chinese competitors engaged 
in piracy, counterfeiting, or infringement of the patented technology 
because local officials and judges investigating allegations of 
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infringement can objectively assess the merits of patent rights 
without local prejudice. 
An international business might also consider granting an 
exclusive license to an existing Chinese enterprise that actively 
engages in pirating, counterfeiting, or infringing the international 
business's patented technology. International businesses seeking to 
pursue this route of the exclusive licensing strategy can use the threat 
of litigation or administrative enforcement as a stick and carrot to 
convince the infringer that accepting the licensing agreement will 
enable it to continue business as usual without ever having to worry 
about future enforcement. Because China is making the necessary 
reforms to increase enforceability of patents, such licenses will only 
increase in value, thus making this strategy more popular over time. 
The international business could further attempt to convince the 
pirate, counterfeiter, or infringer that the licensing royalties would 
amount to no more than the administrative sanctions or damages 
award if found liable by local officials. Therefore, the incentives for 
accepting a royalty-bearing license for sales of the patented 
technology are increased because the time and expense of defending 
enforcement actions are forgone in favor of continuing business as 
usual. 
Moreover, the threat of preliminary or permanent injunction is 
completely eliminated upon acceptance of a licensing agreement so 
there is absolutely no risk in having to stop operations altogether by 
agreeing to such a licensing provision. Given the availability of 
criminal enforcement of patent rights in China, a Chinese infringer 
operating on a large enough scale might find such a licensing 
agreement a favorable alternative to administrative sanctions or 
imprisonment. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Obtaining and enforcing patent protection in China is a double-
edged sword. On the negative side, corruption, bribery, and 
protectionism permit widespread piracy, counterfeiting, and 
infringement in China. On the positive side, the Chinese market is 
among the largest potential consumer market and China's economy 
has experienced exponential growth. More importantly, trends in 
global competition suggest international businesses are increasingly 
seeking to obtain patent protectio in China. China's record of recent 
reforms is promising, including its status as a signatory to all of the 
most significant international intellectual property treaties. Thus, 
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despite the negative concerns, substantial positive reasons exist for 
obtaining patent protection in China. Given that corruption, bribery, 
and protectionism typically favor Chinese enterprises, international 
businesses that create the perception of a Chinese enterprise can help 
diminish the incentives for Chinese courts to reward pirates, 
counterfeiters, and infringers. 
An international business that successfully creates the perception 
of a Chinese enterprise will be difficult to distinguish from the 
pirates, counterfeiters, and infringers that typically benefit from local 
corruption, bribery, and protectionism. As this distinction is blurred, 
Chinese judicial and administrative officials can begin to focus less on 
the identity of parties and more on the merits of the patent claims. 
In this regard, creating the perception of a Chinese enterprise is an 
effective practical strategy to obtain and enforce patents in China. 
International businesses can create the perception of a Chinese 
enterprise in three principal ways. First, they can open research 
facilities in China to develop and patent technology in there. Second, 
they can employ an acquisition and licensing strategy to purchase a 
stake in a local Chinese enterprise and to license the patented 
technology to the Chinese enterprise. And finally, they can choose to 
grant an exclusive license to eXlstmg Chinese enterprises. 
International businesses should consult with Chinese counsel to 
determine which strategy will best suit their needs and best effectuate 
their desire to wield the double-edged sword of patent protection in 
China. 
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